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ABSTRACT
In late 2017, DuraTable received a number of unsolicited inquiries regarding its interest
in selling out in a going private transaction, mostly from private equity firms. Since the
chairman of the board and founder, Gary Reynolds, was approaching retirement age and
the largest single shareholder who had provided the seed capital to start the company
was over 80 years old, Mr. Reynolds was willing to consider a sale and provided
information to four or five of them to prepare bids. DuraTable was a closely held
company with relatively few individuals holding the vast majority of shares. As such,
DuraTable’s shares traded infrequently. As a result, Mr. Reynolds questioned if even the
share price itself appropriately reflected the value of the company. As he looked forward
to a meeting that would be held with Pierce the following week, Mr. Reynolds asked
himself, ‘What price would reflect a fair valuation of DuraTable’s operations?’
Keywords: acquisition, private equity, small business, entrepreneurship, valuation
JEL Codes: G32, G34
I.

Introduction

With the start of a new year, DuraTable Inc. found itself weighing the possibility
of making a new start of its own. In late 2017, DuraTable received a number of
unsolicited inquiries regarding its interest in selling out in a going private transaction,
most from private equity firms. Since the chairman of the board and founder, Gary
Reynolds, was approaching retirement age and the largest single shareholder who had
provided the seed capital to start the company was over 80 years old, Mr. Reynolds was
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willing to consider a sale and provided information to four or five of them to prepare
bids. DuraTable was trading at about $18 per share at the time.
After receiving indications of interest from three of them, Mr. Reynolds chose
the buyer he was most comfortable with, and allowed them to come in and perform a
detailed due diligence. Once Mr. Reynolds realized that the buyer intended to shut down
the operations and combine DuraTable with another of their portfolio companies several
states away from the current location, Mr. Reynolds changed his mind about the buyer.
He did not want to disrupt the lives of the many employees that had been loyal to him
over the years since the founding of the company.
Mr. Reynolds turned to his second choice and asked for a letter-of-intent from
Heaps Investments, a private equity firm which would keep the operations in its current
location. In its letter, Heaps expressed interest in acquiring DuraTable’s furniture
manufacturing operations through a leveraged buyout (LBO). During the weeks that
followed, DuraTable entertained Heaps’ interest and provided Heaps with the
operational and financial information it had requested as part of its due diligence process.
While Heaps was preparing their offer, legal counsel for the board indicated they
should determine what an appropriate price for the company would be to meet their
duty of care as board members and avoid shareholder litigation.
DuraTable was a closely held company with relatively few individuals holding
the vast majority of shares. As such, DuraTable’s shares traded infrequently. As a result,
Mr. Reynolds questioned if even the share price itself appropriately reflected the value
of the company. As he looked forward to a meeting that would be held with Heaps the
following week, Mr. Reynolds asked himself, ‘What price would reflect a fair valuation
of DuraTable’s operations?’
II.

DuraTable Inc.

Located in Boulder, Colorado, DuraTable Inc. was far removed from the central
hub of furniture manufacturing, usually considered to be High Point, North Carolina.
Nevertheless, DuraTable had made a niche for itself by providing collapsible and
stackable furnishings that were both light weight and highly durable. Its market niche
had been the highest end of the market with clients which frequently used tables and
chairs and required tables that could be repeatedly stacked, stored, taken down and put
in place by workers who were often less-than-gentle with the tables. DuraTable’s tables
were capable of sustaining two thousand pounds, whereas competitors’ tables would
collapse under 400 or 500 pounds of weight. DuraTable tables typically sold for a price
premium over most competitors due to their greater durability and compact storage.
Founded in 1997, DuraTable had grown to a $60 million business by the end of FY 2017.
DuraTable’s various product lines could roughly be grouped in three categories:
collapsible (folding) tables, collapsible (folding) chairs, and stackable chairs. The
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products included in each of these categories were offered in a variety of styles and at
various price points. Collectively, DuraTable’s product offerings targeted the banquet
furnishings segment of the contract furniture market. Exhibit 1 shows products
representative of each of DuraTable’s major product categories.
Within the banquet furnishings market segment, DuraTable faced two distinct
groups of competitors. First were the various contract furniture providers that competed
directly against DuraTable for contracts with hotels, military bases, schools, and other
institutions. Notably, among contract furniture providers, DuraTable was somewhat
unique in its offering of both collapsible and stackable furniture. The second group
competing directly against DuraTable consisted of companies that manufactured low
cost, less durable collapsible tables and chairs, including high volume manufacturers such
as Lifetime Products. Although DuraTable’s product quality was recognizably superior
to that of its low cost competitors, the prices charged for DuraTable’s individual
products were largely governed by the low end alternatives.
Like most furniture manufacturers, DuraTable was notoriously subject to
economic volatility, especially in the commercial real-estate market. However, unlike
many contract furniture providers, DuraTable had shielded itself to some degree from
this volatility by securing volume contracts with organizations whose growth was largely
unaffected by economic trends. Exhibit 2 provides a listing of DuraTable’s largest
customer segments based on sales volume.
During recent years, DuraTable experienced steady sales growth, with revenues
increasing from $40 million to $55 million from 2013 to 2016. Net income followed a
similar trend, excluding FY 2015 (See Exhibit 4). Forecasts for the coming years indicate
that growth trends would continue. Revenue is projected to exceed $70 million by 2020.
During the past five years DuraTable had provided investors with an average
return of over 14%, a near 2% premium over the S&P 500 Index during the same period.
However, during this period DuraTable had performed below their industry average
which boasted an annual return of approximately 19%.
Beyond its base furniture market, DuraTable had purchased a Canadian
manufacturer of inexpensive wheeled chairs used primarily in elder-care facilities. This
subsidiary represented about $9 million of DuraTable revenues and just under $2 million
of EBIT. Although the Canadian acquisition had proven very profitable, a more recent
acquisition of a manufacturer of inexpensive office furniture had proven disastrous. The
acquisition was eventually shut down and sold off in 2012 through 2014.
In the last few years, DuraTable had developed a roto-molding process with the
original intent of producing tables that could withstand the outdoors environment.
Ultimately, the process failed to be stable enough to produce the high-quality tables that
DuraTable felt necessary to maintain their reputation. However, one of the engineers
suggested that the process could be used to produce a fence with much higher strength
and durability than the common polyvinyl fencing. By 2006, fence sales were a trivial
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part of total sales, the costs of development had hurt DuraTable’s margins for the last
four years, and it was clear that the fence industry was a much more intensely competitive
industry than DuraTable was anticipating. In 2006, the fencing product had EBIT of
negative $1.2 million.
III.

Industry Background

The furniture manufacturing industry was made up of two major segments –
residential and commercial. Of the two, the residential segment was larger, accounting
for approximately 60% of the industry’s $65 billion annual revenue. The industry as a
whole was highly segmented with the largest 50 companies controlling less than 40% of
the market. Additionally, within the industry there were approximately 20,000 individual
manufacturers. The largest of these manufacturers typically produced a relatively small
number of standard products in large volumes. In general, as the quality and
customization of a product increased, the size of the manufacturing firm typically
decreased. At the extreme upper end, a manufacturer may have only produced between
one and five pieces of furniture each day, with retail prices ranging from $10,000$100,000 per piece.
Across both the residential and commercial segments, similar products were
produced using near identical manufacturing technology. The vast majority of products
produced for either the residential or commercial markets could be classified in one of
three broad categories: metal, upholstered, or case-good (finished wood) furniture.
However, because of the relatively small size of many manufacturers, most firms in the
furniture industry chose to focus on either the residential or the commercial market but
not both. A major reason behind this strategy was the highly unique sales and
distribution networks used within the two segments. Residential furniture was almost
universally distributed through retail showrooms, such as RC Willey, Ethan Allen, Ashley
Home Stores, and countless local chains. Commercial furniture, on the other hand, was
primarily channeled through wholesalers and/or networks of independent dealers. Most
contract furniture manufacturers, excluding DuraTable, distributed their products
almost exclusively through the independent dealer networks. DuraTable, on the other
hand, used a direct sales force that made frequent calls on their major customers and
spent time establishing new contracts.
For most contract furniture manufacturers, the dealer networks provided a
critical link to the end customer. Often it was the dealer rather than the manufacturer
that would contract with a hotel, school, or other institution to provide the required
furnishings. The dealer would then seek competitive bids from a number of furniture
manufacturers. Notably, in the furniture industry dealer contracts were jointly
nonexclusive. This nonexclusively allowed a dealer to carry many product lines, including
product lines offered by competing manufacturers. However, it also allowed a
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manufacturer to distribute their products through multiple dealers within a single
geographic region. Additionally, these nonexclusive contracts lowered the barriers to
entry faced by contract furniture manufacturers by allowing even the smallest
manufacturers access to the marketplace through the dealer networks. In an attempt to
reduce their supply chain costs, many larger manufacturers and institutional customers
had recently bypassed the dealer networks and have negotiated contracts directly with
one another. DuraTable’s early development of this strategy and sole reliance on its own
direct marketing force differentiated it significantly from other competitors.
IV.

Heaps Investments LLC

Heaps Investments LLC was founded in 2001 by Ryan Heaps, an early partner
of the well-known Bain Capital. Heaps’ initial fund of $135 million was largely garnered
from wealthy individuals including a number of international investors. During the
decade following its establishment, Heaps had primarily invested in the entertainment
and communications industries. More recently, Heaps had diversified its holdings
through the acquisition of a number of national restaurant and retail chains. In late 2017,
Heaps managed assets valued at approximately $750 million. As was the case with many
private equity firms, Heaps imposed an annual fee on the total value of its managed
portfolio plus a percentage of any gains on the value of the portfolio.
During the first 10 years of its operation, Heaps had gained significant expertise
in the retail, communication, and entertainment industries. More recently, however,
Heaps had begun seeking investment opportunities in various manufacturing operations.
In early 2017, Heaps had taken part in the acquisition of a firm that manufactured nondurable consumer products. However, Heaps was only a junior member of the
syndication for the completed the deal and had minimal direct involvement in the
company’s daily operations. For Heaps, if the deal were to go through, the acquisition
of DuraTable would be the first time it had taken sole ownership of a manufacturing
firm and would be its first experience manufacturing durable products such as furniture.
V.

Private Equity Investing

Private equity was an alternative form of investment that involved taking
ownership in privately held companies. Private equity historically had broadly
encompassed a number of well-known investment types including: venture capital, hedge
funds, leveraged buyout (LBO) and mezzanine investments, each of which possessed a
different risk/return profile. In recent years, private equity had generally come to refer
to entities that would singly or in small partnerships acquire entire firms, often publicly
traded, using high amounts of leverage.
Private equity firms established serial private equity funds and took a position in
each. Private equity funds were generally illiquid, closed-end funds with a lifespan of 10EVANS & HEATON * DURATABLE ENTERPRISES * 60
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12 years. During its lifecycle, a fund progressed through three distinct stages: fundraising,
investment, and realization. Over time, private equity firms managed multiple funds, with
each fund at a different stage in its respective lifecycle. Individual funds were typically
structured as partnerships between the firm and investors. Investors were generally
limited partners with the firm being the general partner. Because private equity funds
generally operated with a long-term horizon, investors were typically institutions, such
as foundations, endowments and pension funds, or high net worth individuals and
families.
Private equity investing started in 1901 when Carnegie Steel Company of
Pittsburgh, PA was purchased from Henry Phipps and Andrew Carnegie by J.P. Morgan
(the man, not the company) for $480 million. A few years later, Henry Phipps used his
portion of the proceeds, a mere $50 million, to found the Bessemer Trust, which was
created to invest in private businesses and other exclusive holdings, thus creating one of
the first firms specifically chartered for private equity investing.
In an effort to increase the level of investment in entrepreneurial ventures and
thereby improve the United States’ technological standing in comparison to the Soviet
Union, the Small Business Act of 1958 was signed into law by President Eisenhower.
This act allowed licensed venture capital firms, known as Small Business Investment
Companies, or SBICs, to borrow money from the government at below-market interest
rates. In turn, these firms would use the government provided funds to invest in a variety
of small businesses. However, because of the governmental restrictions placed on SBICs,
SBICs grew slowly.
Private, non-SBIC firms that offered more flexibility than their government
licensed counterparts began to grow and gain traction in the marketplace. Within a few
short years, there were more independent private equity firms than SBICs. One of these
independent private equity groups, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), was
recognized as having completed the first official leveraged buyout (LBO). However,
because of the broad economic difficulties faced throughout 1970’s, LBOs were all but
forgotten until the 1980s. Contributing to the broad economic difficulties of the 1970’s
and the associated decrease in investments was the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which discouraged pension funds from participating in
any kind of “risky” investments, including private equity.
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s private equity investing began to grow steadily.
Much of this growth resulted from a decrease in capital gains tax and the relaxation of
some of the ERISA legislation. As a result of these legislative changes, pension funds
began to invest heavily in private equity. During the decade that followed, LBOs became
increasingly common. A few well publicized LBOs tainted the image of private equity
which came to epitomize the “ruthless capitalism” and “greed” pervading Wall Street at
the time. Various private equity firms chose different paths. Those that focused on new
startups (‘seed capital’) or fast growth technology firms became generally known as
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Venture Capital firms. Those that focused on a variety of highly specialized and technical
trading strategies generally became known as hedge funds. Those that focused on
purchasing entire firms and used high levels of debt generally became known as private
equity.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, private equity rose in popularity. In fact,
private equity investing had become so main stream that a number of the largest private
equity firms, including Blackstone Group, had become publicly traded corporations.
These IPOs had given the more typical investor access to private equity investing that
had previously only been available to institutions or high wealth individuals. Accelerating
the growth in private equity was the huge amount of debt available at historically very
low rates. Much of the money buying U.S. debt was coming from foreign government
sovereign wealth funds and foreign central banks. The flood of liquidity had dramatically
reduced interest rates (see Exhibit 8).
Due to the huge growth in professional money management firms and funds
starting in the early 1980s, outperforming market indexes such as the S&P 500 on a riskadjusted basis became not only difficult but rare, especially after management fees. On
the other hand, private equity, like other non-traditional asset classes, offered greater
hope of above market returns. Not all private equity managers had equal access to good
investment opportunities, management resources, research, and industry expertise. This
inequality resulted in the best private equity managers leveraging advantages to generate
above-market returns in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
However, with higher returns came higher risks. Risk measurement in the public
markets was much less subjective and easier to quantify than in private equity. However,
private companies and publicly traded companies were quite similar when considering
fundamental economic risk factors. One large difference was that in the private equity
market, assets were infrequently valued.
A typical private equity fund would establish a separate entity (a “fund”), put in
its own capital as the general partner and then raise additional equity from limited
partners until it reached the fund target size. Once a fund was raised, it would be closed
and the money would be ‘deployed’ on a number of deals in which additional debt was
raised for each deal, usually three to five times the amount of equity the fund placed in
a deal. The debt for each deal was generally raised as nonrecourse using only the assets
of the acquired company as collateral. Each fund would have a target life of about ten
years and then each fund would be ‘harvested’ as each of the deal companies were sold
or taken public with an initial public offering (IPO) and the funds distributed to the
investors. The standard fee arrangement was “2 and 20”, meaning that the private equity
fund would be paid 2% of the investment amount until harvest and then would collect
20% of any gain on each company as it was sold or taken public.
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VI.

Estimating a Reasonable Offer

To assist in the board’s responsibilities to determine a ‘full and fair market value’
as their ‘duty of care’ required, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) had prepared the
forecasts for the next few years. (See Exhibit 4.) The projections were in nominal terms
and assumed an inflation of about 2.5% to 3% per year. In December 2017, a new tax
law was passed that reduced the federal corporate income tax rate from 36.2% to
approximately 21%.
In the coming years, DuraTable’s combined federal and Colorado state corporate
income tax rate was estimated to be approximately 24%. Capital expenditures were
projected to be about $2.2 million in 2018 and would grow with sales. Based on
DuraTable’s current capital structure, the CFO had estimated DuraTable’s weighted
average cost of capital at 12.5%.
In addition to their own forecasts, the CFO had sought out a number of public
companies within the industry that could be used as points of reference (See Exhibit 5)
in valuing DuraTable’s operations. Each of these firms was notably larger than
DuraTable and all operated in a slightly different market niche. However, each firm
derived a significant portion of its income from furniture manufacturing.
The CFO had also gathered general current and historical capital market
information that might prove useful in the valuation process (Exhibit 6). Despite
relatively low levels of debt, none of the competitors had an investment grade rating;
most relied on privately placed debt and had never even been rated by the major credit
rating agencies. In determining a discount rate, it was well known that investors required
higher rates on smaller companies than what the Capital Asset Pricing Model estimated.
The CFO included data for the ‘size premium’ which represented historical data on the
additional return over the Capital Asset Pricing Model that smaller companies had
offered (See Exhibit 7).

EVANS & HEATON * DURATABLE ENTERPRISES * 63

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 20, NO. 1 (WINTER 2018) 56-71

Exhibit 1 – Representative Products

Rectangular Folding Table

Folding Chair

Stacking Banquet Chair

Healthcare Chair

Exhibit 2 – Major Customer Segments
Customers Segment

Percent of Total Sales

Churches/Religious Organizations

27%

Government Institutions

16%

Hotels/Convention Centers

19%

Schools

15%

Businesses/Individuals/Non-Institutional

23%
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Exhibit 3: DuraTable Historical Financial Statements
Dura-Table - Consolidated Statements of Income (000's)
Year Ended December 31,
Net sales
Cost of products sold
Gross profit
Operating expenses:
Selling
General and administrative
Research and development
Asset impairment
Total operating expenses
Income from continuing operations
Other income (expense) :
Investment income
Interest expense
Other, net
Total other income, net
Income before provision for income
taxes and minority interest
Provision for income taxes
Net income before minority interest
Minority interest
Net income from continuing operations
Discontinued operations
Estimated loss on disposal
Net Income

2017

-----------$60,338
40,793
-----------19,545
8,760
2,538
1,548
-----------12,846
-----------6,699
113
(115)
52
-----------50
-----------6,749
2,302
-----------4,447
-----------$4,447
-----------$4,447

2016

-----------$55,701
35,947
-----------19,754
7,903
2,012
1,734
-----------11,649
-----------8,105
310
(63)
-----------247
-----------8,352
2,811
-----------5,541
-----------$5,541
-----------$5,541

2015

-----------$50,272
33,537
-----------16,735
7,427
1,980
1,265
2,226
-----------12,898
-----------3,837
171
(113)
-----------58
-----------3,895
1,448
-----------2,447
22
-----------$2,469
-----------$2,469

2014

-----------$45,210
28,037
-----------17,173
6,452
1,787
1,393
-----------9,632
-----------7,541
79
(180)
-----------(101)
-----------7,440
2,766
-----------4,674
79
-----------$4,753
-----------$4,753

2013

-----------$40,965
24,457
-----------16,508
6,172
2,504
1,541
-----------10,217
-----------6,291
229
(97)
-----------132
-----------6,423
2,367
-----------4,056
07
-----------$4,063
745
-----------$4,808

2012

-----------$40,094
23,738
-----------16,356
6,363
2,028
1,158
-----------9,549
-----------6,807
348
20
-----------368
-----------7,175
2,772
-----------4,403
-----------$4,403
(271)
(3,256)
-----------$876
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Exhibit 3 (Continued): DuraTable Historical Financial Statements
Dura-Table Consolidated Balance Sheets (000's)

ASSETS
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents
Available-for-sale securities
Accounts receivable (Net of Allowances)
Inventories
Other current assets
Total current assets
Property and equipment, net
Deferred income tax assets
Intangible assets, net
Other assets, net
Total Assets
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities
Total current liabilities
Net borrowing on long-term line of credit
Minority interest
Total liabilities
Stockholders' equity:
Common stock, $.01 par value, authorized
10,000,000 shares, issued 3,334,111
Additional paid-in capital
Retained earnings
Accumulated other comprehensive income
Total stockholders' equity
Total Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity

Net Working Capital as %

2017
------------

2016
------------

2015
------------

2014
------------

2013
------------

2012
------------

$302
8,978
4,763
1,166
--------------15,209
15,734
199
2,371
91
--------------$33,604

$4,787
4,547
6,718
2,587
1,057
--------------19,696
12,485
248
2,358
32
--------------$34,819

$3,940
7,151
6,463
2,518
1,012
--------------21,084
11,714
403
2,306
109
--------------$35,616

$6,382
1,050
5,586
2,339
1,826
--------------17,183
13,230
63
1,136
344
--------------$31,956

$2,203
2,336
3,792
1,368
2,193
--------------11,892
11,656
376
1,010
468
--------------$25,402

$8,926
4,593
4,382
1,235
5,279
--------------24,415
6,286
405
932
1,331
--------------$33,369

$2,956
4,155
--------------7,111
3,151
--------------10,262
--------------33

$1,989
2,427
--------------4,416
--------------4,416
--------------40

$1,736
2,616
--------------4,352
--------------4,352
--------------43

$2,088
2,035
--------------4,123
34
--------------4,157
--------------43

$2,184
1,639
--------------3,823
125
--------------3,948
--------------41

$1,649
4,401
--------------6,050
--------------6,050
--------------50

10,725
11,668
916
--------------23,342
--------------$33,604

12,244
17,247
872
--------------30,403
--------------$34,819

12,208
18,337
676
--------------31,264
--------------$35,616

11,469
15,868
419
--------------27,799
--------------$31,956

9,925
11,376
112
--------------21,454
--------------$25,402

11,755
15,615
(101)
--------------27,319
--------------$33,369

10.99%

8.78%

9.21%

8.41%

3.26%
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Exhibit 3 (Continued): DuraTable Historical Financial Statements
Dura-Table - Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (000's)
Year Ended December 31,
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:
Net income
Adjustments to reconcile net income to
net cash provided by operating activities:
Net gain on disposal of discontinued operations
Asset impairment
Depreciation and Amortization
Deferred taxes
Loss (gain) on disposal of property and equipment
Tax benefit from exercise of stock options
Excess tax benefit from stock-based compensation
Stock-based compensation
Changes in assets and liabilities:
Accounts receivable
Inventories
Tax receivable
Prepaid expenses and other current assets
Accounts payable
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities
Net cash provided by continuing operating activities
Net cash provided by discontinued operations
Net cash provided by operating activities
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:
Purchases of available-for-sale securities
Sales and maturities of available-for-sale securities
Proceeds from sale of property and
equipment
Purchases of property and equipment
Purchase of Versipanel
Net decrease (increase) in other asset, net
Purchase of intellectual property
Decrease (increase) in notes receivable
Purchase of DO Group (net of cash acquired)
Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities
Net cash provided by discontinued operations
Net cash used in investing activities
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:
Net proceeds from exercise of stock options and
issuance of shares to the 401(k) plan
Minority interest
Proceeds from lines of credit
Payments on lines of credit
Tax benefit from exercise of stock options
Purchase and retirement of common stock
Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities
Net cash used in discontinued operations
Net cash used in financing activities
Effect of exchange rate changes on cash
Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year

2017
------------

2016
------------

2015
2014
2013
2012
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------

$4,447

$5,541

$2,469

$4,753

$4,808

$876

0
1,706
63
(02)
(23)
307

0
1,474
456
29
314
-

0
2,226
1,830
(473)
(06)
125
-

1,634
383
114
440
-

(745)
1,191
2,511
27
37
-

3,527
1,178
(1,234)
04
12
-

(2,257)
(2,177)
(122)
598
1,166
-----------3,706
-----------3,706

(180)
(43)
(341)
194
(199)
-----------7,245
-----------7,245

(652)
(88)
784
107
(420)
462
-----------6,364
-----------6,364

(1,667)
(913)
508
(194)
(137)
373
-----------5,294
-----------5,294

666
(99)
(1,120)
165
511
(2,775)
-----------5,177
2,902
-----------8,079

469
285
865
(221)
(768)
2,007
-----------7,000
3,217
-----------10,217

(845)
5,396

(4,664)
7,276

(7,591)
1,478

(1,463)
2,750

(2,787)
5,060

(10,673)
7,241

17
(4,589)
(64)
-----------(85)
-----------(85)

32
(2,236)
77
-----------485
-----------485

85
(2,142)
(1,201)
(30)
-----------(9,401)
-----------(9,401)

01
(3,270)
87
-----------(1,895)
-----------(1,895)

14
(6,577)
232
(82)
-----------(4,140)
250
-----------(3,890)

04
(1,198)
(50)
(436)
-----------(5,112)
(36)
-----------(5,148)

242
15,421
(11,690)
23
(12,124)
-----------(8,128)
---------------------------------22
-----------(4,485)
4,787
-----------$302

1,123
(8,035)
-----------(6,912)
---------------------------------29
-----------847
3,940
-----------$4,787

614
(34)
-----------580
---------------------------------15
-----------(2,442)
6,382
-----------$3,940

1,181
(91)
(336)
-----------754
----------------------754
-----------26
-----------4,933
2,203
-----------$7,136

379
(07)
(11,302)
-----------(10,930)
----------------------(10,930)
-----------18
-----------(6,723)
8,926
-----------$2,203

418
(1,419)
-----------(1,001)
----------------------(1,001)
-----------1
-----------4,069
4,857
-----------$8,926
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Exhibit 4: DuraTable Financial Projections
Year Ended December 31,
Net Sales
COGS
Gross Profit
Selling
G&A
R&D
Operating Expenses
EBITDA
- Depreciation
EBIT

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

$62,400
41,184
21,216
8,736
2,496
1,548
12,780
8,436
1,498
6,938

$67,392
44,182
23,210
9,435
2,682
1,096
13,213
9,997
1,540
8,457

$72,109
47,160
24,950
10,095
2,827
1,160
14,082
10,868
1,582
9,286

$76,797
50,148
26,648
10,752
2,995
1,224
14,970
11,678
1,593
10,085

$81,404
52,994
28,410
11,397
3,134
1,282
15,813
12,597
1,642
10,955

$85,475
55,558
29,916
11,966
3,248
1,333
16,548
13,368
1,683
11,685

Edwards Machinery KRC Polymers

Jones Mfg

Exhibit 5: Furniture Manufacturers (January 1, 2018)
AC Steel
Financial Data ($ 1000s):
LTM Revenues
LTM EBITDA
Equity
Short Term Debt
Long Term Debt
Cash
Market Data:
Shares (millions)
Share Price
Beta

$3,060.0
254.1
1,238.0
5.1
250.0
527.2

146.85
$16.34
0.81

NRT Mfg

MetalTech

$2,680.0
282.0
496.4
29.7
286.0
28.0

47.92
$44.41
0.86

$1,820.0
222.9
155.6
10.4
173.2
76.4

62.92
$36.36
0.80

$1,260.0
69.9
427.5
27.5
1.0
35.0

38.5
$24.30
0.87

$982.2
136.6
4.4
3.0
347.3
16.0

42.69
$22.00
0.95

$221.6
16.1
48.9
7.6
10.2
1.9

14.38
$7.80
0.78
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Exhibit 6: Capital Market Data (Early 2018)
Treasury and Corporate Bond Yields
Maturity Treasurys

1
1.80
5
2.25
10
2.47
15
5.53
20
2.64
25
2.73
30
2.81
Source: Bloomberg

AA

1.93
2.59
3.15
3.44
3.58
3.64
3.70

A

BBB

BB

2.05
2.26
2.73
3.08
3.29
3.76
3.69
4.18
3.82
4.32
3.82
4.28
3.79
4.23
January 1, 2018

B

3.05
4.38
5.41

3.41
5.14
6.33

6.10
6.42
6.35

7.26

6.34

8.11

7.74
8.12

LIBOR (3 month) in early 2018: 1.7%
Standard and Poor's Ratios: US Industrial Corporations: Median Ratios

EBIT interest coverage
EBITDA interest coverage
Funds from operations/total debt(%)
Free operating cash flow/total debt (%)
Total debt/EBITDA (x)
Return on capital (%)
Total debt/total debt + equity(%)

AAA
34.9
38.8
190.2
154.6
0.4
30.5
13.3

Average Annual Returns
1926-2017
Common Stocks

AA
16.6
20.8
76.9
42.5
1
29.9
27.6

A
10.8
13.3
54
30.9
1.5
21.7
36.1

BBB
5.9
7.8
34.8
14
2.3
15.1
45.3

BB
3.6
5.1
26.9
7.8
3
12.6
52.9

B
1.4
2.2
11.6
2.1
5.4
8.6
75.6

Geometric Arithmetic Standard
Mean
Mean Deviation
10.4%
12.3%
20.1%

Small Company Stocks
Long- Term Corporate Bonds
Long-Term Government Bonds
Intermediate-Term Gov’t Bonds
U.S. Treasury Bills
Inflation Rates

12.7%
5.9%
5.4%
5.3%
3.7%
3.0%

17.4%
6.2%
5.8%
5.4%
3.8%
3.1%

32.7%
8.5%
9.2%
5.7%
3.1%
4.3%
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Exhibit 7: Size Premium Data (January 2018)
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Exhibit 8: Treasury Rates
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